Analysis of the Solarwinds breach

Sunburst – overview

This is the first stage backdoor installed on the victim’s solarwinds Orion server. It is digitally signed & downloaded as a package update from the compromised solarwinds update server.
Sunburst is a first stage backdoor used to evaluate the victim’s environment in order to decide if the victim is interesting for further exploitation.
Sunburst lies dormant for 12-14 days (configurable) & when it runs it performs a check for security tools running on the computer from opsec perspectives.
Sunburst hides its communication as a legitimized solarwinds Orion communication protocol called OIP. While communicating with a C2 coordinator using DNS protocol to stay stealthy from network detection.
Sunburst also uses local solarwinds configuration files in order to hide its configuration variables.

  • Type: Implant/Backdoor
  • Filename: Solarwinds.orion.core.businesslayer.dll
  • Signed: yes
  • Installation type: remote, compromised on update/install
  • Init: 12-14 days after installation (configurable)
  • Persistence: by solarwinds service
  • Abilities:
    • File xfer
    • File execution
    • System profiling
    • Reboot
    • Disable service
  • Communication: OIP protocol (SW HTTP API) + DNS
  • Storage: plugin config (solarwinds)
  • Main C2: avsvmcloud.com
  • Opsec:
    • Check if in victim’s domain
    • Check blacklisted services
    • Disable blacklisted services
    • Encode dns queries to C2
    • Check for internet connection to SW domain
    • Check CIDR range
    • C2 DNS coordinator
    • Driver query (WMI)
    • Named pipe (only 1 instance)
    • Steganography, Encoding
  • Installation: MSP file
  • Vector: DLL
  • Language: .NET
  • Invoke: Inventory manager plugin of SW

Sunburst – Detection

  • New upload paths to server (C2)
  • DNS:
    • DNS bursts to same domain (X in X minutes)
    • # of DNS queries to server
    • DNS queries return different IP’s
    • 5 Levels domain name
    • Query length
  • New connection to unknown domains
  • SW activity to domains not related to SW
  • SW UA reaching domains different than SW
  • Upload rate/size
  • Active scans: C2 RDP response with victim’s hostname

Supernova – overview

Supernova is a dynamically compiled Web Shell which runs in memory, it is a piece of code injected into a legit solarwinds server side file which its original purpose is to return a logo of a network device to agents. The attacker added 4 new get parameters to the file which allows them to dynamically run C# code on the victim host. Since it runs in memory only, dynamically compiled & runs legit C# code it will evade any file system scanner such as AV software.

  • Type: Dynamically compiled web shell
  • Filename: app_web_logoimagehandler.ashx.dll
  • Invoke: added 4 new parameters to API
  • Persistence: compiles in memory on the fly
  • Signed: NO
  • Init: implanted API runs C# code from C2 on the fly in memory
  • Parameters:
    • Clazz – C# object name
    • Method – method to invoke
    • Args – arguments to method
    • Codes – namespace/assembly/Code to compile

Supernova – Detection

New GET parameters in API

  • Method allows upload of files (instead of statically returning logo.gif)
  • API requests from non-Orion servers/outside the corporate
  • API returns plain text http header in reply (text/plain) instead of (image/gif)

TearDrop – overview

TearDrop is a memory only dropper which drops CobaltStrike beacon disguised as a JPG file.

  • Type: memory dropper
  • Init: Service
  • Config: gracious_truth.jpg (fake header, probably beacon)
  • Usage: drop beacon
  • File: netsetupsvc.dll
  • InstalledBy: Sunburst backdoor()

CosmicGale – overview

CosmicGale is credential theft & reconnaissance PowerShell script intended to harvest credentials & encrypt the results on a local file

  • Type: Credential Theft & Reconnaissance
  • Vector: PS script
  • Actions:
    • Get credentials using get-pass-hashes script
    • Clear log files
    • Write data to encrypted file

Interactive activity – overview

  • Reconnaissance:
    • GetUserList & Role from exchange server
    • Get info on virtual directories on exchange servers
    • Get info from AD using ADFIND
  • Lateral MVMT:
    • Schtasks on remote machines (RPC/DCOM)
    • SMB shares
    • WMI actions
  • Exfiltration:
    • Through local folders using tools
    • Remotely through HTTP root directories on Exchange server (OWA)
    • Through email exfiltration

Interactive activity – detection

  • NTLM authentications from different users on remote machines
  • SMB read/write/delete file on remote machines
  • DCE-RPC binds
  • Multiple usage of credentials to target/s (SMB/AD)
  • Multiple usage of credentials in small time frame
  • Direct file download from Exchange server on HTTP root/special folders
  • Increase in number of hosts logged into
  • First time logon to a server from a user
  • Remote WMI over RPC
  • New RDP connections
  • Increase in total number of RDP connection in network
  • Increase in interactive logons
  • New user email accounts
  • File header different from file extension (for toolset)
  • User account used from remote geo-locations
  • Many logins from server outside the network (1 to many)
  • SMB file manipulation in short amount of time
  • Increase in number of SCHTASKS
  • C2 hostname = victim’s hostname
linkedin facebook twitter

Learn more about WireX paradigm shift to Incident Response

Top 3 requirements to turbocharge your Incident Response

Read about WireX Systems Incident Response Platform